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N

on-state armed groups (NSAGs)2 have become the most

This article aims to enhance the understanding of different incen-

frequent users of landmines and the main drivers of new

tives and dynamics at play on rebel behavior. Insights on this field

landmine contamination. Often portrayed as the “perfect

could inform government authorities, civil-society organizations, and

soldier” due to their low cost, easy availability, and high lethality,

advocacy groups when engaging with NSAGs.

landmines have become the weapon of choice of many rebel groups.
An initial assessment by Geneva Call reported that, in 2005, at least
sixty rebel groups in twenty-four countries had used mines.

In

Previous scholarship has addressed the logic of violence and restraint
for different patterns of violence against civilians, such as indiscrimi-

tives to comply with existing humanitarian norms.6 Engaging them

nate violence, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and gender-based and

in restricting or renouncing the use of landmines remains one of the

sexual violence.12 Similarly, scholars have concentrated on explaining

most pressing practical obstacles toward a mine-free world.

compliance to humanitarian norms, with a focus on child soldiering

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of landmines and other

and the protection of prisoners of war, aid workers, and other catego-

explosive devices varies significantly in the level of restraint exercised

ries of non-combatants. While some scholars have developed theo-

by NSAGs. Some rebel groups indiscriminately lay mines irrespective

retical frameworks that could be generalized to other contexts, only

of potential collateral damage,4 some directly target civilians,7 and

a small number of authors have developed theoretical explanations of

others restrict themselves to command-detonated devices against gov-

rebel restraint on landmine use.13,14 However, meaningfully contribut-

ernment forces.8 Still, some NSAGs have committed to the total ban

ing to the scarce literature on this topic, these authors adopt a rather

on landmines and others engage in mine action activities in one way

narrow measure of restraint as commitment and compliance to a total

or another.9 This wide difference in behavior raises the question: What

ban on landmines.

explains variation in rebel restraint on landmine use?

Inherently indiscriminate weapons, anti-personnel landmines aim

Restraint on landmine use can be divided into two components.

not to kill but maim the enemy, so that the wounded and agonizing sol-

First, landmine use reflects the different categories in which landmines

dier would further consume the enemy’s resources and decrease their

are employed, namely in strategy, type of device, trigger mechanism,

morale. Coupled with its secretive and unpredictable nature, land-

location, frequency, and information-sharing. Second, restraint entails

mines are highly effective in creating a permanent condition of uncer-

the deliberate behavior to restrict the use of violence. Civilians are vic-

tainty and fear. Whether they are placed to directly target civilians or

timized by unrestrained violence either by direct one-sided violence or

are left as remnants of war, landmines can cause significant harm to

by collateral damage from the conflict. Therefore, landmine use should

civilians and disrupt the social fabric of affected communities. In addi-

vary depending on a given NSAG’s restraint behavior.

tion to the physical harm leading to death and permanent disabilities

Significant academic attention has been devoted to the causes and

to survivors, psychological trauma, fear, and stress are widespread in

dynamics of violence against civilians. However, scholars have given

mine-affected populations. Communities also suffer collectively by

much less emphasis on explaining the cases when violence does

restricted access to livelihoods, key infrastructure, water sources, and

not happen, i.e., cases of restraint and compliance to humanitar-

are either forced to move or impeded to return to their homes.15

ian norms. Throughout this article, restraint is defined as deliber-

Given its nature, landmine use considerably differs from other

ate actions limiting the use of violence,11 while compliance takes the

forms of violence against civilians, such as indiscriminate or sexual

meaning of adherence to humanitarian norms, more specifically to

violence. First, landmine use entails significant logistic and coordi-

International Humanitarian Law (IHL).6 Because IHL explicitly calls

nation capabilities. It follows that landmine use should reflect some

for restraint in the use of violence, it is often hard to distinguish the

strategic, rather than opportunistic, reasoning. Second, due to their

two concepts both in practice and in theory. Even though the literature

static nature, landmines bring about geographically localized effects,

on both concepts will be addressed in this section, it is worth noting

meaning that landmines are more likely to affect specific groups

that restraint can be exercised without compliance to humanitarian

depending on where they are placed. Third, most landmines remain

norms, such as when it is addressed only to specific groups.

active long after conflicts have ended, when virtually all mine victims
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contrast with state governments, rebels have considerably less incen-
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Variable

Indicators

strategy

type of device
trigger
mechanism
Restraint on
landmine use

location

frequency
markings

direct restraint

Variation

Violence against
civilians

Collateral damage

Level of restraint

nuisance

direct

accepted

low

economic gain

direct

accepted

low

defensive

indirect

accepted

moderate

offensive

indirect

avoided

high

booby-trap

direct

accepted

low

anti-personnel mine

indirect

accepted

moderate

anti-vehicle mine

indirect

avoided

high

victim-activated

indirect

accepted

moderate

command-detonated

indirect

avoided

high

civilian targets

direct

accepted

low

populated areas

indirect

accepted

moderate

military targets

indirect

avoided

high

unpopulated areas

indirect

avoided

high

frequent

indirect

accepted

moderate

sporadic

indirect

avoided

high

unmarked minefields

indirect

accepted

moderate

marked minefields

indirect

avoided

high

terror tactics

direct

accepted

low

no restraint policy

indirect

accepted

moderate

restraint policy

indirect

avoided

high

Table 1. Conceptualization of rebel restraint on landmine use.
All graphics courtesy of the author.

are non-combatants. Accounting for this longstanding and usually

often laid to protect an important source of revenue such as coca crops

delayed effect on civilians requires long-term perspective and strategic

in Latin America or diamond and gold mines in sub-Saharan Africa.

thinking. Fourth, civilians may be either the direct target of mines or

However, in some cases, NSAGs may use landmines to directly extract

the collateral damage of the fighting; however, even in the latter case,

revenues from the population, such as charging road tolls.4 Other

armed groups should have accepted the risk of civilians falling victims

types of mine use that serve no direct military or economic purpose

of their mines.

are sometimes labelled nuisance mining. This strategy has been used

Having said that, existing theories need to be adapted or reframed

to disrupt access to key infrastructure. Landmine use that is aimed

when examining landmine use; but it is first necessary to conceptual-

deliberately at civilians in order to empty territories, deny use of basic

ize what restraint on landmine use is and how it can vary.

facilities, displace communities, isolate regions, or simply spread ter-

Strategy. Factors such as the level of power asymmetry, the phase

ror also falls under this category.4

of the conflict, the extent of territorial control, the availability of land-

Type of device. Landmines may serve different purposes depend-

mines, and the knowledge in producing improvised explosive devices

ing on their main target. The most common types of landmine are

(IEDs) may all influence the strategy behind the use of landmines.

anti-personnel and anti-vehicle, which are respectively designed to

A Geneva Call report identified four main strategies guiding mine

detonate by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.

use, namely defensive, offensive, economic gain, and nuisance mining.4

Although not considered landmines, the so-called booby traps are

In defensive strategies, landmines aim to deter an enemy attack and

explosive devices disguised as otherwise harmless objects. Although

restrict access to particular areas or routes of military value. Among

other types of mines exist, this study is restricted to anti-personnel

NSAGs, landmines are used for defensive purposes or for slowing

and anti-vehicle mines, and booby traps, which are the focus of the

down the movement of enemy troops. Mines may also be laid follow-

main treaties and are arguably more disruptive to civilian life than

ing a defensive rationale for the protection of the group’s constitu-

other types of explosive devices. In this regard, it is implied that rebel

ency, family members, or key individuals.4 Landmines also serve an

groups demonstrate different levels of restraint, depending on which

offensive strategy when their goal is to kill or maim the opposing

type of device is mostly used. The use of anti-vehicle landmines implies

force, such as to block escape routes during ambushes and counter-

a higher level of restraint, while the use of anti-personnel landmines

attacks, or in direct targeting of government forces or individuals.4

and booby traps implies lower levels of restraint.

When employed under an economic gain strategy, mines do not serve

Trigger mechanisms. Mines and other explosive devices can be

any direct military purpose but economic interests. Landmines are

activated by a wide variety of trigger mechanisms, such as pressure,
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pull, tension release, or pressure release.16 In relation to civilian harm,

Taking into account how landmine use relates to violence against

however, what matters most is whether the explosive device is victim-

civilians, and, thus, restraint, Table 1 summarizes the conceptualiza-

activated or command-detonated. Regardless of the exact type of trig-

tion of rebel restraint on landmine use.

ger mechanism, civilians face significantly more risk if the device is
victim-activated, that is, if the device is designed to detonate by the victim only, without any external action. Command-detonated explosive
devices, conversely, are monitored and set off by an operator at a chosen moment, thus avoiding unnecessary collateral damage.16 This does
not mean that command-detonated devices present no risk whatsoever
to civilians, as they can be used to directly target civilians, and, in case
of failing to detonate, they are left as explosive hazards threatening
the population.17 Regarding the use of landmines and other explosives
devices, restraint is thus higher for command-detonated devices and
lower for victim-activated devices.
Location. The location of landmines depends mostly on their
strategic use. However, in comparison with government forces,
NSAGs often have less capacity to lay large quantities of mines,
and, instead of large and coherent minefields, NSAGs tend to place
mines in smaller, more precise locations.18 Rebel groups are also
more likely to deploy landmines more indiscriminately and near
civilian-dense areas.19 It follows that whether landmines are laid in
areas with higher or lower risk to civilians can thus indicate different levels of restraint by rebel groups.
Frequency. The frequency in the use of landmines varies significantly among NSAGs. While some employ mines as their weapon of
choice, others use them only sporadically, given a specific “need” or
context in the conflict.4 Again, frequency may also be subject not to
a specific strategy or policy, but to contextual factors, such as group
capacity, access to landmines, conflict dynamics, among others.
Nonetheless, restraint on landmine use can also be demonstrated by
the frequency that rebel groups lay mines or other explosive devices.
It follows that, without considering other contextual factors, the lower
the frequency of use, the higher the level of restraint.
Information-sharing. When compared to professional militaries,
NSAGs are less likely to follow international marking standards20 for
their minefields.9 For civilians, this means increased risk of inadvertently walking through minefields and increased costs in future mine
clearance. Likewise, rebel minefields usually do not follow conventional patterns.18,19 In 2006, at least thirty NSAGs had engaged in some

EXPLAINING VARIATION IN RESTRAINT ON
LANDMINE USE
Current theories on restraint range from rationalist to sociological
approaches. In one instance, restraint may be the product of a rational
examination of different economic, political, and military interests.
Armed groups consider factors such as reputation with their constituency and other stakeholders (e.g., international community), as well
as the military advantage of having certain weapons or employing
tactics.23 Alternatively, restraint may be influenced by organizational
factors, such as military culture, and both formal and informal socialization mechanisms.24 Recent research found that NSAGs’ behavior
towards violence or restraint is the product of their sources of authority, beliefs, traditions, and the group members themselves.11 Finally,
contextual factors could lead to a lesser exercise of violence but not
necessarily mean genuine restraint. Because this study is ultimately
intended to understand the reasons of restraint, it is important to point
to what restraint is not.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Not all NSAGs are able to employ landmines, and reduction in landmine use does not mean genuine restraint was employed. A common
example is the seasonal use of landmines, which are only seldom laid
during winter due to frozen soil and heavy snowfall.25 The systematic
use of landmines requires significant logistic capability and group
cohesion; therefore, an NSAG with decreased group capacity could
display reduced use of landmines.11 Likewise, decreased access to landmines and other explosive components, as well as technical expertise
in production of handmade mines or IEDs, will limit landmine use.
Finally, landmine use may be reduced due to evolving conflict dynamics, as NSAGs experiencing major victories are more likely to reduce
landmine use.4 Unrestrained behavior may also be subject to other
dynamics, even if the rebel leadership is committed to limit the use
of violence. Reasons for unrestrained behavior and noncompliance
include conflicting military training and doctrine, 26 absence of political
training, 27–30 and problems in leadership and command and control.31

kind of information-sharing or mine risk education to affected communities.9 Therefore, restraint on landmine use is reflected by whether

procurement

minefields and mined areas are marked, and on how information
about them is recorded and shared.

manufacture

Direct restraint. In addition to restraint in relation to the use of

logistics

landmines, direct forms of restraint can also be found on the non-use
of landmines. Direct restraint can be exercised by rebel groups in codes

transportation

of conduct, internal policies, trainings, and doctrines, as well as in unilateral declarations and ceasefire or peace agreements. For example,

technical expertise
weather

mentions the duty to inform civilians of the location of mined areas.

group cohesion

Conversely, some rebel groups might not formally restrict their use of
landmines but do so in practice. Other groups, however, might use
landmines and other explosive devices in a virtually unrestrained way.

50

contextual factors

the Colombian National Liberation Army’s code of conduct explicitly
21,22
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storage

conflict dynamics
Figure 1. Contextual factors influencing reduction in landmine use.

STRATEGIC INCENTIVES
Although seemingly counterintuitive, landmine use may inflict significant military and economic costs on rebels. First, rebels are constantly victimized by their own mines, either during the production of
improvised devices, when laying landmines, or unwillingly activating
them after they have been laid. NSAGs largely underreport their own
casualties due to the rebels’ interests in portraying the image of a professional and cohesive group. However, the National Democratic Front
in Myanmar stated that up to 80 percent of its handmade mine manufacturers died when assembling improvised landmines. 32 Likewise, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s Army (SPLM/A) is believed to
have suffered significant casualties from their own mines. 33 In these
cases, exercising restraint on landmine use is a matter of safety and
morale for the rebel group’s own ranks, continuity of operations, and
the group’s very survival.
Second, particularly in the cases where NSAGs hold control of
territory, using landmines in the land rebels are fighting for entails
an inherent contradiction, as mine contamination and future mine
clearance might be excessively costly. 34 Furthermore, NSAGs may be
economically dependent on the revenues of the land, in which case
denying access to it with landmines would decrease their revenues.
Thus, it is expected that rebels would avoid contaminating productive
land in their own territory.
A second category of strategic incentives of restraint are political
and reputational costs. Landmine use can influence how NSAGs are

Likewise, compliance with IHL may ensure practical and legal securities to rebels, in particular to the leadership, such as granting the
legal status of combatants and reciprocity in treatment by government
forces.6 Accordingly, a recent study led by Gleditsch shows that decisions to commit to a landmine ban, by both governments and NSAGs,
are mutually dependent.13 Likewise, Fazal and Kovaev have demonstrated that militarily strong groups seeking international recognition are more likely to commit to a landmine ban.14,43 Their argument
focuses on reputation costs and benefits of compliance to international
norms in comparison to the military utility of landmines and other
methods of war.
Similarly, rebel leaders may fear criminal indictment for ordering
the use of anti-personnel landmines. A report has found that rebel
groups are more likely to exert restraint on landmine use in countries
where the use of landmines and other similar victim-activated explosive devices has been criminalized by domestic law.4 The effectiveness
of criminal justice in fostering compliance, however, is still debated.44
It is worth noting that the aforementioned strategic incentives
are interconnected. Political and reputational costs may have direct
impact on material support from both the rebel group’s constituency
and domestic and international audiences, thus compounding to military and economic costs. Similarly, decreased military efficiency could
lead to decreased political support.

MORAL INCENTIVES

perceived by their constituency and other domestic and international

Restraint may also derive from genuine commitment to humanitar-

audiences. Civilian support has long been considered a central deter-

ian principles, whether they are based on humanitarian norms or the

minant of civil war outcomes, 35 as civilians provide recruits, food,

group’s own values, beliefs, and traditions.

information, and safe hiding places. It follows that dependence on

Indiscriminate violence is condemned in virtually all cultures,

civilian support creates restraint on the level of one-sided violence, 36

so it is expected that armed groups should avoid unnecessary civil-

as well as incentives to protect the armed group’s constituency. 37

ian casualties, unless otherwise justified. Moral obligation has been

Under a similar logic, de la Calle38 argues that civilian victimization

found to influence decision-making even over material costs and stra-

is driven by rebel strength, in the sense that weaker rebels would seek

tegic interests.45

civilian support.

Sanín and Wood explore the ideology of shaping rebel violence

Furthermore, local communities are particularly vulnerable to

and restraint,46 and find that specific ideological and religious moti-

landmines and other explosive devices. An NSAG in Myanmar, for

vations can further influence increased restraint and compliance to

instance, has allegedly changed their mine use policy after realizing

humanitarian norms.47 The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (com-

that up to 30 percent of mine victims came from the rebels’ own eth-

monly referred to as the Taliban), for instance, officially considered

nic group. 32 As a direct consequence of victimization by landmines,

the use of landmines “an un-Islamic and anti-human act,” which

local communities could decrease support to the armed group. 34 It is

“would be punished in accordance with Islamic Law.”48 Similarly, the

possible that the affected communities would demand the NSAGs to

Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Buncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB)

restrict their use of landmines and demine certain areas, as observed

and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party of the Philippines issued a joint

in Colombia 39 and Senegal.40

statement renouncing the use of landmines on ideological grounds.49

Civilian victimization also entails significant reputational costs

Restraint may also be driven by interaction with potential victims.

to other domestic and international audiences, particularly towards

In Colombia, rebel groups oftentimes voluntarily marked mine areas

human rights-conscious audiences.6 Abiding to a shared legal frame-

or engaged in mine clearance to preserve the communities where they

work—such as international law—plays in favor of rebel groups’ per-

operated. Arguably, genuine interest in protecting civilians from the

ceived political legitimacy. Exercising restraint on landmine use,

effects of landmines comes from ethnic and family ties, as well as con-

therefore, entails compliance to international (and sometimes domes-

tinued interaction with the communities. 39

tic) law

and could increase the likelihood of external support,

Knowledge and acceptance of IHL may also genuinely lead to

political participation, and leverage in negotiations. As an example,

restraint on landmine use. Practitioners have found that sustained

Herr found that SPLM/A adhered to the landmine ban due to transna-

engagement with NSAGs, in particular through education and

tional pressure and fear of legitimacy loss.

awareness of humanitarian norms, constitutes an important step

6,19,41

42

ISSUE 24.1 @ SPRING/SUMMER 2020

51

during manufacture

own casualties
economic and military costs

during operations and movements
future clearance costs

land use

dependence on agriculture

strategic incentives

status of combatants

legal securities

expectation of reciprocity
possibility of criminal indictment

political and reputational costs

constituency

restraint on
landmine use

decreased legitimacy

domestic audiences
international audiences

respect to humanitarian norms

moral incentives

knowledge and acceptance of international humanitarian law
respect for human life

values, beliefs, and traditions

religion
ideology

Figure 2. Influencing factors for restraint on landmine use.

towards restraint on landmine use. 50 State and non-state armed
actors alike often lack long-term perspective on the humanitarian
consequences of their own actions, hence the change in behavior
after engaging with human rights and humanitarian norms advocates. 51 In Myanmar, for instance, the Karen National Union, a rebel
group and landmine user, agreed to cooperate with mine action
organizations after a series of meetings conveying the relevance of
international humanitarian law. 50

FUTURE RESEARCH
In recent years, rebels have been the most prolific users of landmines; however, little has been studied on what drives NSAGs to exercise restraint on landmine use. This study has sought to identify and
map possible explanations for this variation. Future research should
measure this variable in different conflict contexts and focus on indepth case studies and process tracing analyses in order to identify the
mechanisms at play in each case. Likewise, future propositions should
account for interaction effects between the different influencing factors
of restraint on landmine use.
Although this article offers no conclusive answer on how to engage
rebels in the landmine ban, it has highlighted possible influencing
factors leading to restraint. Relevant to policymakers and practitioners, it offers potential entry points and avenues for future dialogue. It remains the task of researchers, policymakers, and practitioners alike to enhance the understanding of rebel motivations to stop
using landmines, and, most importantly, act upon them.
See endnotes page 70

52

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Henrique Siniciato Terra Garbino
Uppsala University
Henrique Garbino is currently a Weapon
Contamination
Delegate
for
the
International Committee of the Red Cross
in Eastern Ukraine. He holds a bachelor’s
of science in Military Sciences from the
Military Academy of Agulhas Negras and
a MA in Peace and Conflict Studies from
Uppsala University. He served in the
Brazilian Army as a combat engineer officer for twelve years
and supported HMA programs in Tajikistan and Ukraine as a
Rotary Peace Fellow in 2018.

